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THE DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT: THE FINAL STEP IN
THE CONSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE
To lose their votes, is the fate of all minorities, and it is their duty to submit;
but this is not a case of votes lost, but of votes taken away, added to those
of the majority, and given to a person to whom the minority is opposed.1
I. Introduction
Voting in a Presidential election in the United States is viewed by many of its
electorate as a simple process whereby the candidate with a plurality,2 if not a
majority,' of the vote receives the honor and accepts the responsibility of the
greatest elected position in the world for a term of four years. This assumption
that the popular vote winner will be elected has not always been realized how-
ever. The elections of 1824, 1876 and 1888 gave the office of the President to
a man who had been rejected at the polls. The reason behind this result is the
use of the Presidential election plan known as the Electoral College.
The Electoral College system allocates to each state'a number of Presidential
electors which equals the aggregate of Representatives and Senators the state
sends to Congress. These electors are selected every four years by the voting
citizens of each state, from a choice of usually two slates representing the
Republican and Democratic parties. The method most often used to determine
which slate of electors will represent that particular state in the Electoral College
balloting is known as the general ticket system. This provides for the party who
wins a plurality of the state's popular vote to receive, en bloc, all of its electors
who are as a matter of course loyal party members. As a result, it does not
matter if the Republicans win a state's popular vote by 1,000 or 1,000,000 votes;
they get all of that state's electoral votes while the Democrats are not represented
at all by that state in the Electoral College. This practice allows a candidate to
win the Presidency while losing at the polls if he wins the several states with
large electoral vote counts, although losing the popular vote nationally.
Other blatant defects of this system are the method of allocation of elec-
toral votes by Congressional representatives and the unit system of voting. This
mode of representation guarantees each state at least three electoral votes, one
Representative and two Senators, no matter how small in number its population
may be. It allows for unequal state representation in electoral voting seemingly
permitting a favoring of the smaller states since Congressional districts are not
equally represented on a national scale. However, since a state casts its electoral
votes en bloc, a voter from a state with a large bloc has a much greater chance
to affect the outcome of a Presidential election than a citizen from a small state
whose vote will affect a much smaller unit of electoral votes which in turn has a
comparatively insignificant effect on the determination of the President.
It is the character of this note to attack the "archaic, undemocratic, complex,
1 41 ANNALS OF GONG. 170 (1823-24) (remarks of Sen. Benton).
2 This term shall be used in the context of this article to indicate a situation where a
candidate receives, or will receive, less than fifty per cent of the total vote cast but more than
any other candidate for the same office.
3 A total of more than fifty per cent of the total vote won or to be won by a candidate.
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ambiguous, indirect and dangerous' 4 Electoral College system and to suggest the
abandonment of such a system replacing it with a direct popular voting scheme
to determine the President. In order to demonstrate the necessity for the abolition
of the Electoral College, a brief history of the events leading up to the adoption
of this compromise by the Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787 is set forth.
In conjunction with this, a succinct synopsis of the evolution of the franchise is
developed. The express purpose of such an outline is the demonstration of the
step-by-step development and expansion of the right to vote in our society
culminating, for purposes of this note, with the Supreme Court decisions of the
1960's setting down the one-man, one-vote doctrine. With the development of
this one-man, one-vote principle established, examples of past election inequalities
are offered to demonstrate how the Electoral College violates the ideal of voter
equality and the fact that only direct popular Presidential election procedures
can foster the democratic ideal of one man, one vote.
II. The Current Method of Presidential Election
A. The Electoral College: Its Beginning
The Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787 had before it the huge and
laborious task of designing an orderly, stable government out of the chaos which
existed from the degeneration of the Confederation government. Questions con-
fronting this august body5 ranged from the slave trade to the number of Senators
each state should be allowed to have in the upper house of the National Legis-
lature, but of all the questions presented and of all the difficulties to be overcome,
the issue of how to appoint a Chief Executive would seem, at first blush, to lend
itself to a quick and easy solution. Yet, no other issue held the attention of the
Convention longer or caused more discussion. Indeed, James Wilson, a delegate
from Pennsylvania remarked during the convention debates that: "This subject
has greatly divided the house, and will also divide the people out of doors. It is in
truth the most difficult of all on which we have had to decide."6
During the course of the Constitutional Convention, three major plans for
the appointment of the President were presented: Election by Congress; elec-
tion by a direct vote of the people throughout the nation; and election by inter-
mediate electors. An integral part of each plan was the basic concept of the
4 AMERICAN BAR AssOCrATION, REPORT OF THE CosmISsION ON ELECTORAL COLLEGE
REFORm, ELECTING THE PRESIDENT 3-4 (1867).
5 An interesting note and one which should be kept in mind is "the fact that twenty-five
of the fifty-six signers of the Declaration of Independence, (and) thirty-one of the forty-five
members of the Constitutional Convention .. .were men who had been trained in the law."
Chroust, The American Legal Profession: 1t0r Agony and Ecstasy. 46 NOTRE DAME LAWYER
487 at487 (1971).
6 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 501 (M. Far-
rand ed. 1911 & 1937) (hereinafter cited as FARRAND).
7 N. PIERCE, THE PEOPLE'S PRESIDENT 39 (1968) (hereinafter cited Pierce). In addition,
numerous alternative plans were brought forward, ranging from proposals that the
state Governors choose the President to one that 15 members of Congress be chosen
by lot to elect the next Chief Executive. None of these alternatives aroused much
interest, and all were shunted aside with little debate. Id.
In all, more than fifteen proposals for electing the President were set forth at the Conven-
tion. See, Feerick, The Electoral College: Why It Was Created, 54 A.B.A.J. 249 (1968).
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office itself. To be sure, the issues concerning the feasibility of a singular Exec-
utive, the re-eligibility of a President and a possible Executive Council to "aid"
the President had to be discussed before the more advanced question of the
mode of election could be settled.
The respected opinion of James Wilson "preferred" as he put it, "a singular
magistrate, as giving the most energy dispatch and responsibility to the office."8
The ultimate opinion was that a single man would feel the greatest responsibility
and administer the public affairs best.9 Opposition to this motion came from
Elbridge Gerry who favored a "policy of annexing a Council to the Executive
in order to give weight (and) inspire confidence" and from Edmund Randolph
who opposed a single Executive which "he regarded as the fetus of monarchy.""
Wilson argued that a single Executive "instead of being the fetus of monarchy
would be the best safe guard against tyranny.""
With the discussion of the issue of the term of the Executive, came sugges-
tions which would have made the term as short as three years or as long as nine
years. Of necessity, coupled with this question was the issue of re-eligibility of the
Executive. Roger Sherman was against the idea of ineligibility since it would
throw "out of office the men best qualified to execute its duties,"' but these con-
siderations were determined to be preliminary points of discussion to be resolved
with the selection of the mode of election of the Executive.
The method most often receiving approval throughout the Convention was
election of the Executive by Congress.' Roger Sherman was of the opinion that
the office of the President was "nothing more than an institution for carrying
the will of the Legislature into effect, that the person or persons ought to be
appointed by and accountable to the Legislature only, which was the depository
of the supreme will of the Society." 4 Elbridge Gerry, opposing this scheme,
urged that the appointment be made by the Executives of the states, stating that:
If the appointment should be made by the National Legislature (Congress),
it would lessen that independence (of the Executive) which ought to prevail,
would give birth to intrigue and corruption between the Executive and
Legislature previous to the election, and to partiality in the Executive after-
wards to the friends who promoted him.'9
Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania was directly opposed to Congressional elec-
tion of the Executive. He felt such a system would reduce the Executive to the
status of "a mere creature of the Legislature." He argued that:
If the Legislature elect, it will be the work of intrigue, of cabal, and of
8 1 FARRAND at 65.
9 Id. Although supporting a singular Executive, John Rutledge was not in favor of giving
him the power of war and peace. Id.
10 Id. at 66.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 68.
13 It was approved on June 2 (for a term of seven (7) years) 1 FARRAND 81; on July 17
2 FARRAND 32; July 24, 2 FARRAND 101; on July 26 (term of seven (7) years) 2 FARRAND 121;
on August 24 (on this day it was decided "both" houses would appoint the executive) 2 FARRAN
403.
14 1 FARRAND at 65.
15 Id. at 175.
[October, 1971]
faction: it 'will be like the election of a Pope by a Icondlave of cardinals;
real merit will rarely be the title to the appointment.16
Concurring with Morris, James Madison argued against Congressional election
on the basis that the three branches of government should be independent as well
as separate of each other.
1 7
The issue of re-eligibility became paramount when discussing Congressional
appointment. Many delegates expressed the opinion that of necessity the Ex-
ecutive would be ineligible for a second term if Congress should so elect. This
in turn, it was opined, would have a deleterious .effect on the incentive and drive
of the Executive to achieve excellence while in office. Also, the fact was realized
that men capable and best qualified would be thrown out of office. 8
A proposal offered to counter that of Congressional election was a plan
of direct popular vote.. In support of this suggestion James Wilson offered the
experience of the election of the Governors of New York and Massachusetts as
evidence of the viability, success and soundness of this system: 9 Governor Morris
agreed with the feasibility of direct election as demonstrated by the many state
gubernatorial systems and added: "If the people should elect, they will never
fail to prefer some man of distinguished: character, or services; some man, if he
might so speak, of continental reputation."20 James Madison, John Dickinson
and Daniel Carroll were also among those eager to see the argument for direct
popular election become a reality, noting that it was the purest and fittest source
of election.2 Madison noted that:
There was one difficulty -however of a serious nature attending an im-
mediate choice by the people. The right of suffrage was much more dif-
fusive in the Northern than the Southern States; and the latter could have
no influence in the election on the score of Negroes.22
Madison in further comment to this difficulty stated "that local considerations
must give way to the general interest. As an individual from the Southern States
he was willing to make the sacrifice. 28
Voicing an objection, which was to crop up repeatedly in future years,
Charles Pinkney declared that "the most populous States by combining in favor
16 "2 FARRAND at 29.
17 Id. at 34. "The Executive could not be independent of the Legislators, if dependent
on the pleasure of that branch for a re-appointment." Id. Besides the general influence of
Congressional election on the independence of the Executive, Madison suggested:1. The election of the Chief Magistrate would agitate & divide the legislature so
much that the public interest would materially suffer by it. 2. The candidate would
intrigue with the legislature, would derive his appointment from the predominant
fdction, and be apt -to render his administration subservient to its views. 3. The
Ministers of foreign powers would have & make use of, the opportunity to mix their
intrigues & influence with the Election.
Id. at 109. See also id. at 500.
18 1 FARRAND 68.
19 Id. In fact at this time in the history of the United States governors were elected by the
people in Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York and Rhode Island. In the
other eight states they were elected by the legislatures. Feerick, supra note 7, at 249.
20 2 FARRAND at 29.
21 Id. at 56-57, 109-111, 114, 402.
22 Id. at 57.
23 Id. at 111.
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of the same individual will be able to carry their points."24 Elbridge Gerry was
fearful of the "ignorance of the people," that this would allow organized groups
to exert influence and "elect the Chief Magistrate in every instance, if the
election be referred to the people."'25 George Mason put it more forcefully when
he stated:
[I]t would be as unnatural to refer the choice of a proper character for
Chief Magistrate to the people, as it would to the people, as it would to
refer a trial of colours to a blind man. The extent of the Country renders
it impossible that the people can have the requisite capacity to judge of the
respective pretensions of the Candidates. 26
In rebuttal to these objections, Gouverneur Morris argued:
It is said that in case of an election by the people the populous States will
combine & elect whom they please. Just the reverse. The people of such
States cannot combine. If their (sic) be any combination it must be among
their representatives in the Legislature. It is said the people will be led by
a few designing men. This might happen in a small district. It can never
happen throughout the continent. In the election of a Governor of New
York, it sometimes is the case in particular spots, that the activity & intrigues
of little partisans are successful, but the general voice of the State is never
influenced by such artifices. It is said the multitude will be uninformed.
It is true they would be uninformed of what passed in the Legislative Con-
clave, if the election were to be made there; but they will not be uninformed
of those great & illustrious characters which have merited their esteem &
confidence.27
Because of the predominant opinion that the electorate of the young country was
too ignorant and too vulnerable to the wills of designing men, the motion to
provide for the direct popular election of the President was defeated on the two
occasions it was brought to a vote.2
As a result of this non-decision, springing from the conflict of the "Congress
to elect group," and those favoring direct election, and because of a number of
other questions, a committee of eleven was appointed on August 31 to suggest
solutions to these issues which would then be acted on by the committee of the
whole. 9
At the time of the formation of this committee, a substantial majority of
24 Id. at 30.
25 Id. at 114.
26 Id. at 31.
27 Id. at 30-31.
28 The tally after the first vote on July 17 was 9 to I against: Massachusetts, no; Conneoti-
cut, no; New Jersey, no; Delaware, no; Maryland, no; Virginia, no; South Carolina, no;
Georgia, no; North Carolina, rro; Pennsylvania, yes. 2 Farrand 32. On August 24 the defeat
was decisive, albeit this time -two states went on record favoring direct election. New Hampshire,
no; Massachusetts, no; Connecticut, no; New Jersey, no; Maryland, no; Virginia, no; North
Carolina, no; South Carolina, no; Georgia, no5 Pennsylvania, yes; Delaware, yes. Jd. at 402.
29 Feerick, The Electoral College-Why It Ought To Be Abolished 37 FoRD. L. REV. 1, 8
(1968). The Committee was made up of a remarkable aggregate of political talent-Rufus King
of Mass., Gouverneur Morris of Pa., James Madison of Va., Daniel Carroll of Md., John Dickin-
son of Del., Abraham Baldwin of Ga., Pierce Butler of S. C., Nicholas Gilman of N. H., David
Brearby of N. J., Hugh Williamson of N. C. and Roger Sherman of Conn. Id. at 8 n.41;
PIERCE at 44.
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this group favored different methods of election than the prominent one at the
moment, which was election by Congress.3" Although divided among themselves
as to what mode of election was preferable, the committee spared no time in
reaching their ingenious compromise. Indeed, they returned to the Convention
just four days later on September 4 with their plan. At this time it was recom-
mended to the Convention that the office of the Vice-President be established and
the mode of election be through intermediate electors--the Electoral College."
This plan resulted because of the objections to a legislative appointment and the
serious misgivings about the competency of the people to elect a man of grand
stature."2 The suggestion was the end product of a group of skillful men who
were well aware of what could be "sold" to the people of their respective states.
The larger states were recognized with the population-based apportionment
in determining the number of electoral votes each state would cast;33 the small
states would realize equal voting rights if the electors could not agree;3 4 appease-
ment of the states' rights advocates was seen in the provision allowing the state
legislature the right to decide how the electors would be chosen; 5 and "those who
wanted to entrust the choice of the President to the people could see at least
the potentiality for popular vote in the scheme presented."36
This plan was thought to remove cabal and intrigue from an election by
the Congress. It was seen as a safeguard against those who would scheme and
devise ways to sway and influence the people, since men of great stature and
public confidence and knowledge would be the electors. They, the electors, were
envisioned as making their own decisions while taking into account the desires
of the people.3 7 Even with these advantages there were still serious objections to
the compromise. Mason was opposed, since the President would be selected by
the Senate, an improper body for that purpose, if the electors failed to give a
majority vote to a candidate. Charles Pinkney was of the same opinion stating
that the "same body of men which will in fact elect the President" will be his
judges in the case of an impeachment.3 " The problem of the Senate selecting
the President in the event of the failure of the electors to choose one was over-
30 Feerick, supra note 29 at 8. Wilson, Madison, Morris, Dickinson and Carroll, as noted,
voiced strong desire for direct election. See supra notes 19, 20, 21, 23 and 27 and text accom-
panying. Williamson had indicated he might back this proposal, suggesting each voter cast
three votes in order that the small states would be heard. 2 FA.RAND 113. Madison, Morris,
King and Wilson also supported election by electors chosen by the people. 1 FARRAND 80; 2
FA=.AND 56-57, 403-04. Butler supported a system of electors chosen by state legislatures, with
the states all having an equal number of votes. Id. at 112. Sherman had supported an election
by Congress. 1 FARRAND 68; 2 FARRAMND 29.
31 Id. at 496-99, also set forth at this time were the Legislature's tax powers, Senate im-
peachment power, Presidential qualifications and Presidential appointment power among others.
32 Feerick supra note 29 at 8. It is also suggested the problem of the large states versus the
small states was a reason for this compromise. PmRCB at 34-37. See generally a letter from
James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, October 24, 1787, for an outline of the problems with
respect to the Executive. 3 FARRAND 131-33.
33 In addition to the two electoral votes representing the two Senators from each state.
34 2 FARRAND at 500; it was felt that nineteen out of twenty times the Senate, later the
House, would choose the President because of state interests.
35 Although the Framers left the manner of selecting the electors to the state legislature, it
appears that many of them assumed that the legislatures would provide for popular election.
Feerick, supra note 6 at 253-54 nn. 40-44.
36 PIaEc at 44.
37 3 FARRAuN 458-59, for a discussion of this see Feerick, supra, note 29, at 9 n.44.
38 2 FARRAND at 500-01.
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come on September 6 when the House was given the task, replacing the Senate. 9
The pressure and tension on the delegates were factors involved in the
production of this imperfect system. Indeed, as James Madison had remarked:
The difficulty of finding an- unexceptional process for appointing the
Executive Organ of a Government such as that of the U.S., was deeply
felt by the Convention; as the final arrangement of it took place in the
latter stage of the Session, it was not exempt from a degree of the hurrying
influence produced by fatigue and impatience in all such Bodies: tho' the
degree was much less than universally prevails in them. 40
It is with this background and history that the Electoral College system
would function for nearly two centuries, drawing severe criticism from the
moment of its conception to the present day.
B. The Electoral College-Procedure
The procedure for counting thousands of votes cast for the various Presi-
dential candidates and then ascertaining the final result varies from state to
state." In general, the names of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential candi-
dates appear on the ballot, albeit some states list the names of the electors,42
Voting is done on a statewide basis and the candidates receiving a plurality of
the state votes win the slate of electoral votes in that state. This process is repeated
in all of the states and the District of Columbia. After all of the electors through-
out the country have been appointed, a meeting takes place on "the first Monday
39 Id. at 519.
40 Letter to George Hay, August 23, 1823, 3 FARRAND 458.
41 See Wroth, Election Contests and the Electoral Vote, 65 DICKINsoN L. REv. 321, 322
(1961) ; Feerick, supra note 29 at 2-3.
42 Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates listed: ALASKA STAT. § 15.30.050 (1970);
ARx. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-206, 3-207 '(Supp. 1969); CAL. ELECTION CODE §§ 10204-5 (West
1961); COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-11-7 (3) (Perm. Cum. Supp. 1969); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 9-175 (1967); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 4502 (a) (Cum. Supp. Pamphlet 1970);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 103.011 '(Supp. 1971-72); GA:. CODE ANN. § 34-1330 (e) (1970); HAWAII
REv. STAT. tit. 2, § 12-33 (1968); IDAHO CODE § 34-904 (Supp. 1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
46, § 21-1 (Smith-Hurd 1965); IND. STAT. ANN. § 29-3901-05 (Burns 1969); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 49-32.33 (1949), 49.42 (Supp. 1970); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-602, 603a (Supp.
1970); Ky. REV. STAT. § 118.170 (6) (1962); LA. REV. STAT. § 18.671 '(a) (1969); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1181 (1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 20-2 (1971); MAss. ANN.
LAWS ch. 54, § 43 (1971); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 168.45 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. 208.04
'(1962); LAWS OF MONT. ch. 368, §§ 214-15 (1969); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 32-421, 22 (1968);
NEv. RFV. STAT. tit. 24, § 293.477 (1969); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 59: 3, 7 (1971); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 19: 14-8.1 (1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-15-4 '(1970); N.Y. ELECTION LAWS
-§ 107 (McKinney 1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-209 (Supp. 1969); N.D. CODE ANN. 16-11-06
(1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.10 '(Page Supp. 1970); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.-26, §
513 (1955); ORE. REv. STAT. § 250.110 (2) (1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3056 '(f)
(1963); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-19-3 (d) (1970); S.C. CODE ANN. 23-400.11 (c) (Supp. 1970);
S.D. COMPILED LAW ANN. § 12-16-6 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-403 (Supp. 1970); TE.
ELECTION CODE art. 6.01 (1967), art. 6.05 (4) (Supp. 1970-71); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-7-5
(1969); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.1-160 (Supp. 1971); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 29.71.020
"(1965); W.VA. CODE § 3-6-2 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 5.64 (Supp. 1971-72); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 22-139.37 (Supp. 1971).
The above list includes states which list the candidates for electors as well as the candidates
for the President and Vice-President on the ballot.
The following states list the electors for President and Vice-President: ALA. CODE tit.
17, § 154 (1959); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-844 (Supp. 1970-71), 16-845 (1956); MIss.
CODE ANN. § 3107-14 '(Supp. 1970); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 128.010 (1966); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
17, §§ 1751, 52 (1968).
[October, 1971]
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afted the second Wednesday in December" following their appointment.4 , On
this date there are fifty-one Electoral College meetings throughout the United
States." . At this meeting the appointed electors cast their votes for the President
and Vice-President, making and signing six separate lists for each and also annex-
ing a list of their namies." These certificates are sealed and certified46 and sent
to the President of the Senate,4 7 the Secretary of State of the state from which
they are elected, the Administrator of General Services and to the Judge of the
District in which the electors have assembled. 4  1,
I In accordance with federal law the sealed -certificates are opened on January
6 before a joint session of Congress meeting in the ,Hall of the House of Repre-
sentatives.49 The President of the Senate opens each certificate in alphabetical
order. After a determination of the count he announces the candidates with a
majority of the electoral votes as President and Vice-President. If in fact no
candidate should realize a majority of the electoral votes cast, -the House then
would choose the President from the three highest candidates. The Senate would
choose the Vice-President from the two highest candidates for that office.' In
the House a quorum would require representation from two-thirds of the states,
and a majority vote-twenty-six states-is necessary to decide upon the Presi-
dent.5" According to the Rules of the House of Representatives,51 a state's vote is
determined by the vote of the majority of representatives who comprise that
Congressional delegation and if, perchance the delegation is evenly split the
state casts no vote.
The decision of who would be Vice-President is determined by a majority
of the whole number of the Senate, a quorum consisting of two-thirds of the
whole number of Senators. 2 if the House was deadlocked and failed to appoint
the President by January 20 (Inauguration Day), the Vice-President would
assume the position of acting President until the House so decided. In a situation
where neither a President nor a Vice-President is-so designated by January 20;
the Speaker of the House, who is appointed at the start of each new Congress,
would act as President until one was decided upon.5"
C. Electoral College-How Its Members Are Appointed
The Constitution provides that "[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner
as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole
Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in
the Congress ... ."" Pursuant to this directive, electors are appointed on the
43 3 U.S.C. § 7 (1970).
44 The term Electoral College is a misnomer since there are fifty-one separate meetings;
the term should be pluralized.
45 3U.S.C.§9 (1970).
46 3 U. S. C. § 10 (1970).
47 Who is the Vice-President of the United States at that time.
48 3 U. S.C. § 11 (1970).
49 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). ,
50 U.S. CONST. art. 11 § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
51 HINDs' PRECEDENTS OF TAE Houst oF REPRESENTATIVES, Vol. III, pp. 292-93. (Wash-
ington, 1970). U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
52 Feerick, supra note 29, at 5.
53 3 U.S.C. § 19 (1970).
54 U.S. CoNsT. art. II § 1.
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Tuesday after the first Monday in November."5 Although now appointed by
popular vote, the selection of electors in this manner was not realized on a uni-
versal scale until the second half of the nineteenth century." Even though the
decision as to how the electors were to be chosen was left to the state legislature,
it was felt by the delegates that the states would provide for the election of the
electors by the people. 7 Nevertheless, from the first election to the election of
1836, legislative selection of the electors ran from a high of ten states in 1800 to a
low of one state in 1836.58
During the first elections the manner of choosing electors varied, depending
on what party was in power and the greatest benefit to be derived from the
various alternatives.5 " Of the choices available--direct choice by the legislature,0 0
popular choice of electors by district61 and a popular vote under a general ticket
system-the general ticket system, after 1836, was the most popular. 2 This
scheme gained rapid popularity because of the winner-take-all advantage and
also because it was felt this system gave a small state much more influence in
deciding the outcome of a President when its votes were cast en bloc. Because
of this big plus gained from the use of the general ticket system, most states felt
a sense of obligation and self-defense in their decision to follow along and adopt
this method of selecting electors."5
The general ticket system has seldom been departed from, but in 1892, the
Michigan Legislature, which was controlled by the Democrats, attempted to
salvage a few votes for their Presidential candidate since it was believed the
Republicans were to be victorious in their state. The plan so advanced by the
Democratic legislature was simple-a reversion back to the district system. This
action brought an almost instant reaction and was challenged in the courts.
Much to the chagrin of the Republicans, however, the system was upheld by the
Supreme Court which decided that the legislative action was in fact within
Constitutional limitations." This system was short-lived though, as Michigan
changed back to the general ticket system in 1892, but now it seems to have
55 3 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
56 Feerick, supra note 29, at 10.
57 When the report of the Committee on style was considered on September 12, 1787,
James Madison remarked: "He (the President) is now to be elected by the people and for four
years." 2 FARRAND 587. Concerning the appointment of the President by intermediate electors
chosen by the states which passed on July 19, 1787, Madison later stated on July 26: "It has
been proposed that the election should be made by Electors chosen by the people for that
purpose." 2 FARRAND 119; see also Letter from James Madison to George Hay, August 23,
1823, in 3 FARRAND 458; Note: State Power to Bind Presidential Electors, 65 COLUM. L. Rxv.
696, 697 (1965).
58 PIERCE, appendix B at 309.
59 PIFRCE, at 74-78.
60 The obvious advantage to this system was that it took the choice out of the hands of the
people, a great aid if the Legislature foresaw defeat of their party if the choice of electors was
left to the people.
61 Madison noted in 1823 that: "The district mode was mostly, if not exclusively, in view
when the Constitution was framed and adopted . . ." Letter to George Hay 3 FARRAND at
458-59.
62 The reasons for its wide acceptance are that the developing ideas of the People's Presi-
dent and democratic ideals were unwilling to leave the crucial choice of Presidential electors in
the hands of state Legislatures; and this system suited the political factions - it was no longer
necessary to share the state's electoral vote with the opposing party. PMRcE at 77.
63 Rosenthal, The Constitution, Congress, and Presidential Elections, 67 MicH. L. Rv. 1,
4-5 (1968).
64 McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 '(1892).
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resurfaced in two other states, Missouri05 and Maine."6 The state of Maine now
provides Electoral College action in the following manner:
Presidential Electors at large shall cast their ballots for President and Vice-
President of the political party which received the largest number of votes
in the State. The Presidential Electors of each congressional district shall
cast their ballots for President and Vice-President of the political party
which received the largest number of votes in each congressional district.6 7
D. Electoral College-Independence of Electors
The evidence is compelling that the Framers envisioned a system under
which persons of the highest caliber would be chosen as electors. These electors
would meet in their various states, "evaluate the merits of various persons for
President,... and in casting their votes, they would take into account the views
of the people, but not be bound by them, as they were to exercise their own
judgment." '
Indeed, few of the Framers of the Constitution foresaw the emergence of
political parties, their effect on elections-national and local-and the fact that
because of the existence of these parties the preliminary selection of electors
would now be regarded as the actual vote for a certain Presidential candidate.6 9
A fact of life that we live with employing this electoral scheme is that although
the Framers intended that the position of elector be filled by a wise, intelligent
pillar of society, these positions have gone "to the party faithful as a reward for
past service, presumably on the basis that being an elector today is merely an
honorary ceremonial position."70  The fact that the American people have
grown "to regard the Electoral College as a matter of minor importance,"' 71 is
underscored by the Presidential voting laws in the several states. 2 The over-
whelning majority of the states do not make provision for the listing of the
names of the electors for President and Vice-President on the ballots. Instead
the names of the candidates themselves are listed and a vote for them is deemed
a vote for the electors of their respective parties.7 1 So common had this system
65 Mo. ANN. STAT. 128.010 (1966).
66 MAINE REV. STATS. 21 § 1184 (1-A) (Supp. 1970-71).
67 Id.
68 Feerick, supra note 29, at 9; Ray V. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 232-33 (1952) '(Justice Jackson
dissenting).
69 McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 36 (1892) ; Rosenthal, supra note 63, at 17.
70 Comment, The Problem of the Faithless Elector, 6 IARv. J. LEois. 254, 260 (1969).
71 Thomas V. Cohen, 146 N.Y.Misc. 836, 841, 262 N.Y.Supp. 320, 326 (1953).
72 See note 42 supra.
73 See note 42 supra. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 19: 14-8.1 (1964). Ballots for presidential
electors: When Presidential Electors are to be elected, their names shall not be printed
upon the ballot, either paper or voting machine, but in lieu thereof, the names of the
candidates of their respective parties or political bodies for President and Vice-
President of the United States shall be printed together in pairs under the title
"Presidential Electors For." All ballots marked for the candidate for President and,
Vice-President of a party or political body, shall be counted as votes for each candi-
date for Presidential Elector of such party or political body.
IND. STAT. ANN. 29-3904 (1969). Votes cast for President and Vice-President construed as
votes for electors - counting, canvassing and certifying of votes.
Every vote cast or registered for -the candidate for president and vice-president of
any one (1) political party or group of petitioners shall be conclusively deemed to be
a vote cast or registered -for all of the candidates of such political party or group of
petitioners for the presidential electors of such party or group of petitioners, and
shall be counted as such. * * *
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become that as early as 1933 it was asked whether this practice of the electors
casting their ballots for the state's popular vote winner could be seen as to have
amended the Constitution to a level where an elector voting against the popular
would be deemed as to have broken the law. A lower court of the state of New
York answered in the affirmative. In Thomas v. Cohen 4 the constitutionality of
listing only the names of the candidates for President and Vice-President, while
omitting the names of the electors for these offices, was brought to task. The
argument challenging this practice went along the lines of the intended free
choice of the electors and the subsequent need of the voting public to be aware
of the identity of the electors. The court recognized the design of the Framers
that the electors can indeed follow their own judgment, nevertheless, it decided
that the long practice embroidered upon the electors the obligation that they vote
for their party's candidate if elected. Judge Cuff went on to say:
The electors are expected to choose the nominee of the party they represent,
and no one else. So sacred and compelling is that obligation upon them, so
long has its observance been recognized by faithful performance, so un-
expected and destructive of order in our land would be its violation, that
the trust that was originally conferred upon the electors by the people, to
express their will by the selections they make, -has, over these many years,
ripened into a bounden duty-as binding upon them as if it were written
into the organic law. The elector who attempted to disregard that duty
could, in my opinion, be required by mandamus to carry out the mandate
of the votes of his State.7 5
In 1936, however, this practice of omitting the electors' names from the
ballots was upheld in the Ohio decision of Hawke v. Myers" on the basis of the
broad authority conferred upon the states by the Constitution to direct the man-
ner in which the Presidential electors are to be chosen.
The Supreme Court has not decided, as of the moment, this issue, although
dicta in a number of state court decisions indicate that this independente of
decision still endures.7 7 However, the question was touched upon tangentially in
Ray v. Blair"8 where it was held that a candidate could be excluded from a
party primary for the position of a Presidential elector if he failed to pledge to
support the party's candidate.
This action was the result of a situation in Alabama where political parties
were authorized to set qualifications and select their nominees for the position of
Presidential elector in a primary. The Executive Committee of Alabama's
Democratic party required a pledge to be taken of all candidates, indicating
their support for the Democratic Presidential nominee, if they are so elected.
One candidate, Edmund Blair, did not take such a pledge, as a result he was not
certified. Lower courts ordered a mandamus directing he be certified. This
74 146 N.Y.Misc., 836, 262 N.Y.Supp. 320 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
75 Id. at 841-42, 262 N.Y.Supp. at 326.
76 132 Ohio St. 18, 4 N.E.2d 397 (1936).
77 See, e.g., State ex rel. Beck v. Hummel,. 150 Ohio St. 127, 146. 80 N.E.2d 899, 908
(1948); Opinion of the Justice, No. 87, 250 Ala. 399, 400, 34 So. 2d 598, 600 (1948);
Breidenthal v. Edwards, 57 Kan. 332, 337, 46P. 469
78 343 U.S. 214 (1952).
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action was upheld by the Alabama Supreme Court, which held such a pledge
was an unconstitutional limitation on an elector's discretion.7
Upon appeal to the United States Supreme Court this decision was reversed
in a five-to-two decision, Justice Reed stating that:
A State's or a political party's exclusion of candidates from a party primary
because they will not pledge to support the party's nominees is a method of
securing party candidates in the general election, pledged to the philosophy
and leadership of that party. It is an exercise of the State's right to ap-
point electors in such manner, subject to possible constitutional limitations,
as it may choose.80
Nevertheless, the Court has never approved the action of a state which
purports to bind an elector after his certification. Indeed, it has suggested that
such a statutory requirement may perhaps be legally unenforceable.8 '
The two dissenting Justices; Jackson' and Douglas, in Ray did indicate
squarely that they regard the elector's freedom of choice to be untrammeled.,,
They declared that "the balloting (of the electors in the Electoral College)
cannot be constitutionally subject to any such control because it was intended to
be free, an act performed after all functions of the electoral process left to the
states have been completed."8"
Many states,84 and the District of Columbia," however, have disregarded
the dicta of the majority and the strong dissent in*Ray and have enacted statutory
provisions binding an elector to cast his vote for his party's Presidential nominee.
The validity of these statutes is suspect since a perusal of the Constitution
reqeals no specific requirement binding electors to vote for the candidates of
their party. An expert in the field of Electoral College law has stated that
"[b]ecause of the design of the Framers that electors be free agents, the pre-
dominant view is that they are under no legally enforceable obligation to do so."'
E. The Electoral College-In 'Practice
On its very first try, the Electoral College was a success, electing General
George Washington President of the new Republic. The-electors cast their ballots
unanimously for Washington and gave John Adams of Massachusetts thirty-four
79 257 Ala. 151, 57 So. 2d 395 (1952).
80 343 U.S. at 227.
81 Id. at 229-30.
82 Id. at 232. '(Jackson dissenting.)
83 Id. at 233. (Jackson dissenting.)
84 ALASKA STAT. § 15.30.090 (1970); CAL. ELECTION CODE § 25105 (1961); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 49-20-1(5) (1970); CONN. REV. STATS. § 9-176 (1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
34-904 (Supp. 1971-72); HAwAn R~xv. LAws § 16-11 (1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-904(Supp. 1969); MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 20-4 (Supp. 1970); NEv. REV. STAT. § 298.050(1967); N.L STAT. ANN. § 3-10-1.1 (1970); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.40 (Supp.
1970); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 519-21 (Supp. 1970-71); ORE. Rnv. STAT. § 248.355(1970); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-403 (Supp. 1970). See also CODE OF VA. § 24.1-162 (Supp.
1971), declaring how electors are "expected" to vote.
85 D.C. CoDa ANN. 1-1108*(g) (1966).
86 Feerick, supra note 29, at 19. For an argument that state power to bind electors would
implement the purpose of the Framers, see Note, State Power To Bind Presidential Electors, 65
COLUM. L. REv. 696 (1965); cf. Kirby, Limitations on the Power of State Legislatures Over
Presidential Elections, 27 LAw & CoNTEMP. Pon. 495. 505-06 (1962).
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of the sixty-nine votes cast making him the first Vice-President."2 Along with
this initial success, two problems with this system became apparent. The first lay
in the method by which the Presidential electors would be chosen.88 The second,
which was a more immediate difficulty, was "double balloting." Each elector
was required to cast two votes for President; he was not given the latitude to
indicate whom he desired to be President. Although a serious problem, it did
not surface completely until the election of 1800.
When Jefferson's time came to guide the nation, he found victory in the
electoral contest of 1800 almost unreachable. There was much bitterness during
this campaign and the seeming closeness of the projected outcome induced both
the Decocratic-Republicans, who sponsored Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr,
and the Federalists, John Adams and Charles Pinckney, to regulate the mode of
selecting the Presidential electors so as to maximize any of their strength while
minimizing that of their opponent.8 9 When the electors of Jefferson's party voted
they failed to take the precaution of withholding one vote from Burr; the result
was a tie with the necessity of the House of Representatives choosing between
Jefferson and Burr. As might have been expected there was much planning and
persuading and dealing. The situation was resolved, however, on the thirty-sixth
ballot." The malady of double voting was remedied with the adoption of the
Twelfth Amendment on June 15, 1804, in time for the election of 1804."
The election of Jefferson ushered in a quarter century of Virginia Presidents
all of whom were members of his Democratic-Republican party--or as it was
later denominated-the Democratic Party. James Madison won easily in 1808
and again in 1812. James Monroe had little difficulty achieving victory in 1816
since the Federalists were weak to the point of offering little if any organized
opposition. Monroe's "Era of Good Feeling" had raised his popularity to such
a point that had it not been for the action of elector Samuel Plumer he would
have shared Washington's distinction as being the unanimous choice of that
electoral college. Mr. Plumer in voting contrary to the expectations of his con-
stituents and casting his ballot for John Q. Adams became the first "unfaithful
elector." 2
In 1824 the two-party system was not functioning as usual and four men-
John Q. Adams, loser of the 1820 election, Andrew Jackson, William H.
87 PIERCE at 59.
88 See notes 54 to 67 and text accompanying.
89 PIERCE at 67.
90 E. RosESBoom, A HISTORY OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, pp. 39-47 (1963).
91 27 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1433 (1971). This amendment was the record holder for
the time needed to ratify at six months, six days. However, this record was almost cut in half
with the adoption of the Twenty-sixth Amendment which was ratified on June 30, 1971, requir-
ing only three months, seven days.
The Twelfth Amendment provided that: (1) electors must vote separately for President
and Vice-President; (2) If the House must choose because of the failure of a candidate to win
a majority of the electoral vote, the House shall pick from the top three electoral vote recipi-
ents, instead of the five stipulated in the original Constitution; (3) If it is necessary for the
House to pick the President and it has not done so by March 4 - now January 20 as per the
Twentieth Amendment - the new Vice-President would act as President until the House
chose; (4) A majority of the electoral votes was also required for the election of a Vice-
President; (5) The eligibility requirements for the Vice-President were made the same as those
of the President.
92 Rosenthal, suprz note 63, at 17.
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Crawford, and Henry Clay-all Democrats at least in name, were nominated
for the Presidency.93 As a result, no one received the majority vote needed; in
accordance with the Constitution the House determined the outcome. After
Clay had thrown his support to Adams the issue was settled on the first ballot
with Adams winning, receiving the vote of thirteen of the twenty-four states;
Jackson and Crawford tallied the votes of seven and four states respectively."
Thus, another first was recorded in the annals of the Electoral College-the
election of a man who was rejected by the popular will. 5
The election of 1836 was a success in so far as a President was elected, but
failed in the attempt to choose a Vice-President. Martin Van Buren received a
majority of the electoral vote; but because of the social behavior of his running
mate, Richard Mentor Johnson, the electors from Virginia withheld their votes
from him. The Senate had to choose a Vice-President for the first and only time;
they elected Johnson thirty-three to sixteen over the runner-up in the Presidential
electoral vote, Francis Granger."
The election of 1876, because of disputes and double returns, ended in the
House with the popular vote-getter the loser. Democrat Samuel J. Tilden was
the recipient of a majority of the popular vote, even by the Republican vote
tabulation..97 Notwithstanding the disputed returns in four states, Tilden had
secured 181 electoral votes and Republican Rutherford B. Hayes won 165 votes.98
A fifteen-member commission was created to decide how the twenty disputed
votes would be cast. Prior to the selection of the fifteenth member of the com-
mission, its membership was evenly split, seven Republicans, seven Democrats.
The men selected represented the Senate, House and Supreme Court, each insti-
tution placing five of its own on the committee. The fifteenth man was by design
to be an independent to be selected by the four committeemen from the Supreme
Court. This man, Justice Joseph Bradley, was the man who chose the President
that year, for he was a Republican and did so vote on every disputed vote. The
result as Neil R. Pierce notes, was that, "The vote of one man-Justice Bradley
-nullifies the voice of the majority and places the usurper in the chair."9
The Presidential contest between Grover Cleveland and Benjamin Harrison
in 1888 is a striking example of a defeat of the popular will although neither
candidate had a majority. After the polls closed a tabulation showed Democratic
Grover Cleveland with 5,540,365 popular votes, which won him 168 electoral
votes, and Republican Benjamin Harrison with 5,445,269 votes and an all
important majority of 233 electoral votes giving him the Presidency.'"0 Cleve-
93 PIERCE appendix A at 304; Rosenthal, supra note 63, at 5.
94 E. Rosehoom, supra note 85, at 84-88.
95 This charge is somewhat suspect, however, since of the twenty-four states participating
in the election, electors of six of the states were chosen by the legislatures, not at the polls, also,
"because of the possibility that Adara may well have been the second choice of most of the
supporters of Clay and Crawford, Adams' election is not a conclusive case of defeat of the
popular will." Rosenthal, supra note 63, at 6.
96 PIERCE at 133-34.
97 Rosenthal, supraz note 63, at 6.
98 lhERCE at 87.
99 PMRC at 91.
100 PIRCE at 93. Equally as startling is the fact that:
While Cleveland's 95,096 popular vote plurality availed him nothing, a switch of a
mere 7,189 votes out of well over 1,000,000 in New York would have swung its thirty-
six electoral votes to his column and enabled him to win by 204 to 197. Ironically,
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land's plurality of 95,096 gave him not so much more than a moral victory.,
This election confirmed what was known and .feared for decades-theElectoral College system is defective, it has in the past and can in the future elect
a man the people have clearly rejected.
III. Evolution of the Franchise
The further the electoral rights are extended, the greater is the need for
extending them: for after each concession, the strength of democracy
increases and its demands increase with its strength."'0
A. The First Voters
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 considered the
question of voter qualifications on a national scale, but because of their differ-
ences and the fact that the states would have been reluctant to ratify a constitU-
tion which changed the suffrage laws of the individual states, the issue was not
acted upon. 2 Indeed, the only voting right assured the people on, a national
scale was that concerning the selection of the members of the House of Repre-
sentatives.
0 3
At the inception of the new republic the number of those who participated
in the various elections was in no way great. The reason for this is twofold:
first, the concept of public concern was at best underdeveloped; and secondly,
the possibility that those citizens who did feel a sense of participation would be
allowed to cast their ballots was severely restrained by the existence of restrictive
suffrage laws.0 4 The majority of these laws reflected the requirement that the
prospective voter possess something of value or at least evidence of it, which could
be shown by the payment of taxes for example.0 s
Delegate David Buel, Jr. argued against the property concept, charging the
difference between Europe and America as the core of his theory. According to
him, it was the design of the aristocracy of Europe to keep the bulk of the land
in a few hands. One of the distinguishing aspects of the American society was
its laws of descent which were causing a steady division of the great estates, en-
abling the many to own land. Buel demanded that:
Our community is an association of persons-of human beings-not a
partnership founded on property.... Property is only one of the incidental
rights of a person who possesses it; and, as such, it must be made secure; but
it does not follow that it must therefore be represented specifically in any
branch of the government. 0 6
four years earlier, Cleveland had beaten Blaine (the Republican nominee of 1884) by
219 electoral votes to 182, also prevailing in the popular shift of 575 'Votes in New
York would have elected Blaine (218-183), despite Cleveland's nationwide plurality.
Rosenthal, supra note 63, at 7.
101 Claude, Nationalization of the Electoral Process, 6 HARV. J. LEols. 139, 141 (1969),
quoting from DE TocQuEvLL., DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 56-57 (1955).
102 PIERCE at 209.
103 U. S. CoNsT. art. 1 § 2.
104 For a summary of these laws see Minor v. Happersett. 88 U.S.. 162, 172773 (1874).
105 PIERCE at 207.
106 MAsoN, FREE GOVERNMENT IN TUE MAKING (1949) pp. 406-07 cited in PIERCE at
249 n.20.
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Even though this argument was recognized and suffrage was expanding
progessively, Blacks were still regarded as second-class citizens and as such were
not allowed the privilege of the ballot box.
B. Black Suffrage
The plight of the Black man continued even after the American Civil War.
President Andrew Johnson's plan for the Confederate states was conspicuous by
its very lack of basic civil liberties for Blacks. Compounding this was the fact that
immediately following the cessation of hostilities of the Civil War many of the
Southern states held conventions or legislative sessions. During these meetings
not one of the states of the Confederacy extended the right to vote to newly
freed people whom they exploited for centuries. On the contrary, the infamous
"Black Codes" were enacted. This legislation severely limited the Black man's
rights as to employment and mobility."'
Following this, the Fourteenth Amendment °8 was proposed by Congress on
June 13, 1866, and was adopted by the states on July 21, 1868. This amendment
was then supplemented by the Fifteenth Amendment which provided that: "The
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States, or by any State on account of race, color or previous condi-
tions of servitude.' 1 09
The United States Supreme Court, however, decided a series of opinions
which emasculated the two new amendments and the enabling legislation relative
to them. Chief justice Waite, speaking for the Court in United States v. Reese"
and United States v. Cruikshank"' decided that the Fifteenth Amendment did
not confer upon the citizens of the United States the right of suffrage, rather it
had the negative effect of preventing discrimination on the basis of race, color
or previous condition of servitude-from this itrseems that the franchise is not
characteristic of national citizenship. The right to participate in any election
held within the boundaries of a state comes from the state although protection
from discrimination comes from the Federal Government. Chief Justice Waite
also stressed the fact that the Fifteenth Amendment did not prohibit an individual
from subverting the vote.
White factions relentlessly continued their determined drive to eliminate
completely the possibility of Black voting in any election."' A number of dis-
criminatory devices were designed and used in furtherance of this goal. Common
for this period were items such as a poll tax, literacy tests, increased residency
requirements and the famous "grandfather clauses." In fact, all eleven states of
107 See U. S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT (1959) pp. 25-28.
108 U. S. CONST. amend. XIV.
109 U. S. CONST. amend. XV; "The Southern States agreed to this amendment as well(as to the Fourteenth), in large part because of the presence of Northern troops and large
numbers of Negroes in the new Southern legislatures." PIERCE at 215.
110 92 U.S. 214 (1876).
111 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
112 See generally Claude, Constitutional Voting Rights and Early U.S. Supreme Doctrine,
f. Negro Hist., Vol. LI, pp. 114-24 (1966).
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the old Confederacy enacted some form of these "Jim Crow Statutes" between
1889 and 1902."'
Since the grandfather clauses, which were designed with the intention of
disfranchising Blacks while overlooking illiterate Whites, were struck down in
1915," a new more subtle approach was sought. Because of the dominance of
the Democratic Party in the South, all that was required of a candidate for
election to the office sought was a victory in the primary which equaled victory
in the election. With this in mind, a new type of discrimination was developed.
Since many states permitted the parties to determine who could vote in a primary,
it was easy to preclude Blacks from casting an effective vote. This was ac-
complished through the practice of disallowing Black participation in the prima-
ries by denominating them something other than Democrats." 5 With the ex-
clusion of Blacks from the primary selection, the discriminatory goal was ac-
complished since a vote against the Democrats in the general election amounted
to nothing. I
This concept was brought before the courts and in 1927 the United States
Supreme Court ruled the "White primary practice" unconstitutional." Although
challenged under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, Justice Holmes
found it unnecessary to consider the Fifteenth Amendment since it seemed hard
for him "to imagine a more direct and obvious infringement of the Fourteenth
Amendment""' than the Texas statute then challenged.""
Following this action, the Texas legislature promptly repealed the statute
condemned by Justice Holmes and substituted another bearing the same number
as the repealed statute. The new legislation provided in pertinent part that:
Every political party in this State through its State Executive Committee
shall have the power to prescribe the qualifications of its own members and
shall in its own way determine who shall be qualified to vote or otherwise
participate in such political party." 9
This was also challenged by the same petitioner and, upon a writ of certio
rari, decided by the Supreme Court. Justice Cardozo disallowed this statute,
arguing that it was a delegation of state power to the executive committee and
as such made the committee's determinations conclusive irrespective of any
expression of the party's will. Thus the committee's action, barring Blacks from
participation in party primaries, was deemed state action, the type of which is
prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 '
Undaunted, the plan then pressed by Southern strategy removed any men-
tion or suggestion of racial restrictions from the state laws but still gave the
individual parties a free hand to determine who could participate in primaries.
Pursuant to this, the State Democratic Convention of Texas adopted a resolution
113 U. S. COMMISSION ON CML RIGHTS, REPORT (1959) pp. 31-32.
114 Guin v. United States, 283 U.S. 347 (1951).
115 hERCE at 217.
116 Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
117 Id. at 540-41.
118 In pertinent part, the statute stated that "in no event shall a Negro be eligible to partici-
pate in a Democratic party primary election in the State of Texas." id. at 540.
119 Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 82 (1932).
120 286 U.S. at 88-89.
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which effectively precluded Blacks from Democratic Party membership and
participation in its deliberations. This resolution finally achieved what was long
sought-the elimination of the Black vote--since it was upheld by the Supreme
Court on the theory that it was the action of a political party and not that of the
state.1
21
This precedent stood for nine long years before the Court reversed itself and
finally outlawed the concept of the White primary altogether. Because of the
claimed inconsistency between the case of United States v. Classic1 2 which
determined, inter alia, that under Louisiana statutes a party primary was in fact
part of the procedure for the choice of federal officials 12 and the decision in
Grovey v. Townsend allowing political parties the power to exclude Blacks from
primaries, the Supreme Court settled the issue by forbidding the White primary
in the case of Smith v. Allwright.'24
The Court reasoned that where a party acts in conformance with state
statutes and takes its character from these statutes, the actions so carried out by
the party are not private laws. "When primaries become a part of the machinery
for choosing officials, state and national, . . . the same tests to determine the
character of discrimination or abridgement should be applied to the primary as
are applied to the general election."' 25 The Court specifically overruled Grovey,
holding that this action came within the meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment.'2 6
In an effort to supplement many of the Court's decisions and ensure
franchise rights, a series of Voting Rights were passed by Congress, the latest
being the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970.2' The effect of this legisla-
tion was to amend the Voting Rights Act of 1965.2 by extending the 1965 Act
to 1975; and also by adding two new supplemental provisions which abolished
residency requirements longer than thirty days for Presidential elections and
lowered the voting age to eighteen.
The 1965 act suspended literacy tests in areas where less than fifty percent
of the voting age citizens had been registered for the 1964 election. It also
provided that anyone who was educated to the sixth-grade level in an American
flag school where languages other than English were used could not be denied the
right to vote because of a lack of facility in the English language. Although
challenged, the education section was upheld in Katzenbach v. Morgan'29 and
Cardona v. Power.'2
The age, literacy and residence provisions of the 1970 act have, like the
1965 act, also been upheld by the Court in the recent case of Oregon v.
Mitchell.'3 Justice Black's opinion announcing the decisions of the Court ex-
pressed the unanimous view that the provision suspending the use of literacy
121 Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
122 313 U.S. 299 '(1941).
123 And Congress has the power to protect rights of Federal suffrage secured by the Constitu-
tion in primary as in general elections. Id. at 314-15.
124 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
125 Id. at 664.
126 Id. at 666.
127 PuB. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (June 22, 1970).
128 79 Stat. 437, 42 U. S. C. 1973.
129 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
130 384 U.S. 672 (1966).
131 ... U.S ...... 27 L. Ed. 2d 272, 91 S. Ct. (1970).
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tests in both federal and state and local elections was valid. Regarding the issue
of residency requirements, absentee registrators and voting in Presidential elec-
tions, eight members of the Court expressed the view that these provisions were
valid. The controversial determination, however, was that dealing with the
lowering of the minimum voting age. This provision was held valid as applied
to federal elections but invalid as applied to state and local elections. Neverthe-
less, the voting age has achieved uniformity with the ratification and adoption
of the Twenty-sixth Amendment." 2
C. P47oman Suffrage
The campaign for the female right to vote was neither as difficult nor as
long coming as the Black man's battle for the ballot. At its inception, the move-
ment for woman suffrage was generally allied with other social movements such
as the extension of education and the Black problem.'33
Americans had no tradition of female voting, indeed most of the early state
laws did not allow women to own property and therefore they could not vote.
The only exceptions to the male-only rules were in Massachusetts where women
could vote from 1691 to 1780 and in New Jersey which granted all inhabitants
who had a worth of $250 or more the right to vote.3 4
After the burden of property requirements and taxpaying qualifications
were removed from state constitutions, the female demand became louder and
the movement acquired more verve. In 1872, Mrs. Virginia Minor applied to
be registered as a voter in the state of Missouri, but was refused because she was
not a male. She sued the registrar who in turn demurred. The Supreme Court
affirmed, deciding that since the "Constitution of the United States does not
confer the right of suffrage upon any one, and that the constitutions and laws
of the several states which commit that important trust (voting) to men alone are
not necessarily void," it could not give the petitioner the relief requested.'
Some fifteen years passed after the Supreme Court was heard in the Minor
decision until Wyoming came into the Union. It was the first state to provide
for woman suffrage in its constitution. In the mid-1890's, Colorado, Utah, and
Idaho granted women the right to vote. A great lull was seen in this respect
until the second decade of the twentieth century. This ten-year period witnessed
the beginning of the modern-day demand for an expanded franchise. In 1912
the Seventeenth Amendment was ratified and adopted providing for the direct
election of each United States Senator. Also during this period at least thirty
states were added to the growing list of jurisdictions allowing women the right
to vote. The impact of this trend was readily felt in the close Presidential elec-
tion of 1916. President Wilson, campaigning on an anti-war theme, won many
of the western states where women had newly won the right to vote.'36 It would
seem appropriate to speculate that Wilson's peace campaign appealed to the
132 U. S. CONST. amnend. XXVI.
133 Woman Suffrage, 29 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 102 (1971 ed.).
134 S.C. CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION REPORT 20 (1959).
135 Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1875).
136 Woman Suffrage, supra note 133, at 104; PIERCE at 222.
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newly enfranchised women and they in turn gave him their votes. Indeed, if
there had been a shift of 1*983 votes from Wilson to Hughes in California (a
state which allowed woman suffrage) the election would have gone to Hughes.237
The Nineteenth Amendment was ratified and declared in effect on August
26, 1920, thus eliminating discrimination on the basis of sex with respect to voting
rights.
D. Sanctity of the Ballot
Coexistent with the Black voting equality movement and woman's suffrage
was the development of the "sanctity of the ballot." Notwithstanding, the fact
that each state may prescribe the "Times, Places and Manner" of the election of
its Representatives and Senators, "Congress may at any time by Law make or
alter such Regulations."'38 Although it had this reserve power, Congress made
almost no attempt to use it until the Fourteenth Amendment set forth dear
standards to apply to determine the honesty of the ballot count. In 1880, the
Court upheld the Congressional authority which provided a statute making it a
penal offense to neglect to perform or violate any duty with regard to an elec-
tion for a Representative in Congress."3 In a later case which concerned itself
with an indictment charging the defendants conspired to intimidate a Black
citizen who attempted to exercise his franchise the Court again upheld the
Congressional right to safeguard the popular elections.40 Justice Miller argued
that:
"It is essential to the successful working of this government that the great
organisms of its executive and legislative branches should be the free choice of the
people as that the original form of it should be."'4 Regarding the question of
Congressional protection of the vote the Court reasoned that once the franchise
has been extended, there is a Constitutional right to have an honest vote count.
Justice Holmes speaking for the Court in United States v. Mosley ' 2 stated that
"we regard it as... unquestionable that the right to have one's vote counted is
as open to protection by Congress as the right to put a ballot in a box."' 48 This
principle was extended to primary elections for federal office as well.'"
Although the Court recognized in McPherson u. Blacker4 ' the right of the
state legislatures to appoint Presidential electors, if they so desire, it warned that if
these electors are so appointed by popular election, the right to vote cannot be
denied or abridged without a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.'" While
noting that Presidential electors are not federal officers or agents, Justice Suther-
land upheld the right of Congress to pass a corrupt practices act regarding
Presidential elections, stating that "they exercise Federal functions under, and
discharge duties in virtue of authority conferred by, the Constitution of the
137 PIERCE appendix E at 321.
138 U. S. CONST. art. I § 4.
139 Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880).
140 ExParteYarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
141 Id. at 666.
142 238 U.S. 383, 386 (1915).
143 Id. at 386.
144 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
145 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
146 Id. at 39.
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United States."' 47 The power of Congress to protect the election of President
and Vice-President from corruption being clear, the choice of means to that end
presents a question primarily addressed to the judgment of Congress.'48
Indeed the guiding principle concerning governmental voting protection
was stated in Ex Parte Yarbrough49 when the Court said:
That a government whose essential character is republican, whose
executive head and legislative body are both elective, whose most numerous
and powerful branch of the legislature is elected by the people directly, has
no power by appropriate laws to secure this election from the influence of
violence, of corruption, and of fraud, is a proposition so startling as to
arrest attention and demand the greatest consideration. 50
E. Reapportionment
Prior to the landmark decisions of the 1960's the leading case concerning
Congressional redestricting was the equivocal precedent of Colegrove v. Green."
There the Court held that reapportionment matters were not "justiciable."
Justice Frankfurter stated that: "The Courts ought not to enter the political
thicket."'M5
In 1962 the Court held in Baker v. Carr.5 that the question of apportion-
ment of state legislatures may be reviewed by federal courts. Following this
landmark decision, Gray v. Sanders54 outlawed the Georgia unit system, a
scheme which is closely related to the Electoral College system. The Georgia
system allocated units to counties on the basis of population blocks. Candidates
for statewide positions were required to obtain a majority of these county-unit
votes in order to be entitled to nomination in the first primary. The effect of
this system was that the vote of each citizen was worth less as the population of
the county in which he resides increases. This allowed the counties which had
about only one-third of the total populati.on of the state to give a candidate a
majority.
The Court, in answering the analogy argument concerning the Electoral
College, acknowledged its "inherent numerical inequality," noting the inclusion
of it in the Constitution validated it but refused to apply its principle to the
states.'55
Justice Douglas noted that since a White vote could be given no more
weight than a Black vote and the urban vote no more weight than rural vote,
"The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to
147 Burroughs and Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534. 545 (1934).
148 Id. at 547.
149 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
150 Id. at 657.
151 328 U.S. 549 (1946). See 45 Mica. L. REv. 368 (1947).
152 328 U.S. at 556; for a discussion of this case in relation to Baker v. Carr, see Freidel-
baum, Baker v. Carr: The New Doctrine of Judicial Intervention and Its Implications for
American Federalism, 29 U. CH. L. REv. 673, 676-94 (1962).
153 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
154 372 U.S. 368'(1963).
155 Id. at 378.
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Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth and Nineteenth
Amendments can mean only one thing--one person, one vote." 56
Even though Baker held that federal courts have jurisdiction over claims
that state legislative apportionments have violated the Fourteenth Amendment,
that such claims are justiciable and voters do have standing to assert such
claims and Gray extended the principle of one-man, one-vote to state elections,
the question of whether the Court would act to correct inequality in Congres-
sional districting was still open to dispute. The reason for this can be seen in
the Constitution which vests in Congress the ultimate supervisory power over
Congressional apportionments. 5 7
The decision of .Wesberry v. Sanders"' put an end to this speculation. A
Georgia statute constructing ten Congressional districts was ruled null and void
because of the vast inequity created among the many districts. Relying on
article one, section two of the Constitution, the Court held the verbiage therein
that "Representatives be chosen 'by the People of the several States' means that
as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a Congressional election is to be
worth as much as another's." '159
Following these pronouncements the mammoth decision of Reynolds u.
Sinsi. was handed down by Chief Justice Warren. There the Court held, inter
alia, that legislators represent people not areas;.6 ' weighting votes differently
according to where citizens reside is discriminatory;' 62 representation in both
Houses of a states's bicameral legislature must be apportioned on a population
basis; 63 and that the resemblance of an apportionment plan to the scheme used
in the federal Congress affords no basis for sustaining such a plan 64
Indeed it is inconceivable that a state would be permitted to allow a citizen
to cast multiple ballots and in the same effect it was held unconstitutional that a
state allow some of its voters to have the power of their ballots multiplied, while
others within the same jurisdiction cast but one vote. As Chief Justice Warren
stated:
A citizen, a qualified voter, is no more nor no less so because he lives
in the city or on the farm. This is the clear and strong command of our
Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. This is an essential part of the
concept of a government of laws and not men. This is at the heart of
Lincoln's vision of "government of the people, by the people, (and) for
the people." The Equal Protection Clause demands no less than substantially
equal State legislative representation for all citizens, of all places as well as
of all races.1 65
The notion that this case acknowledging the Constitutional necessity of en-
156 Id. at 381.
157 U. S. CoNsT. art. 1 §§ 4, 5. See also Carpenter, Wesberry v. Sanders: A Case of Over-
simplification, 9 VILL. L. Rav. 415, 416 (1964).
158 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
159 Id. at 7-8.
160 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
161 Id. at 562.
162 Id. at 563-68.
163 Id. at 568-76.
164 Id. at 571-77.
165 Id. at 568.
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suring voting equality when choosing one's representatives has solved other
related problems in the "political thicket" is at best puerile. Indeed, Supreme
Court action subsequent to Reynolds has explained or extended the principle of
one-man, one-vote in many instances,"6 but many voting inequities still remain
unresolved. Paramount among these is the Electoral College,16 which at the
same time dilutes the worth of one citizen's vote while increasing that of another.
F. The Sixth Voting Theory"'
In addition to the five theories 69 upon which the right to vote is from time
to time based, it is now being suggested that a sixth theory, built upon the Con-
stitution, has developed.
Indeed as Dean Kirby has noted:
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as applied
under the one-man, one-vote, has produced a new theory of voting rights
which partakes both the natural rights and ethical theories; but it is best
understood as a new theory of its own, couched in political equality. The
right to vote now flourishes under the simple principle that, except as
dictated by necessity, citizens should have equal voices in the electoral
process.'
7 0
Although, not specifically stated in the Constitution, the right to vote has
been recognized by the Court to be a fundamental right; 1'7 1 it has also been
acknowledged as "preservative of all rights."' 7 2
In Griswald v. Connecticut,1'7 the Court invalidated a Connecticut statute
which forbade the use or dissemination of contraceptives. The opinion of Justice
Douglas relied upon the "penumbra" of the First Amendment and other areas
of the Bill of Rights, identifying particular rights riot so mentioned therein as
being protected. Can it now be argued that the established right to vote is not
similarly protected? It is no longer open to question that the right to vote is
embroidered with the same characteristics as those other rights which cannot be
denied or diluted without violating those "fundamental principles of liberty and
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions."'17 4
166 See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969), where the good faith effort to
achieve precise mathematical equality was required in lieu of the de minimus approach, id. at
530-31; Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966) where Hawaii was allowed to apportion on
the basis of registered voters because of special circumstances; Hadley v. Junior College Dist.,
397 U.S ....... (1970) extending one-man, one-vote to the election of trustees of a junior college
district.
167 The winner-take-all system was upheld in Williams v. Virginia, -288 F. Supp. 622
'(1968), aff'd, 393 U.S. 320 (1969), and in Delaware v. New York 385 U.S. 895 (1966) refus-
ing Delaware leave to file a multiparty suit challenging the winner-take-all system.
168 See generally Kirby, The Constitutional Right to Vote, 45 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 995 (1970).
169 They are: 1) the citizenship theory, 2) the vested privilege theory, 3) "the natural rights
theory, 4) the government function theory, and 5) the ethical theory. Id. at 996.
170 Id. at 1005.
171 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Carrington v. Rash,
380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965).
172 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
173 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
174 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932).
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IV. Direct Presidential Election
A. The Inequities of the Electoral College System
If oppression, dilution and debasement of the vote have been disallowed in
local, state, Congressional and Senatorial contests, there is no reason it should
continue on the Presidential level.
The use of the present Presidential election scheme gives a citizen living in
the most heavily populated states more potential for affecting the outcome of a
Presidential election contest than a citizen residing in a sparsely populated state.
At first it might seem that just the opposite would be true. However, even
though a voter in Alaska with its three electoral votes might, have a greater
chance in effecting the outcome 6f" the selection of his state's electors than a voter
in California with forty-five electoral votes, the California voter has a much
greater chance of affecting the outcome of the entire election because of the size
of the electoral bloc his vote may potentially effect. More simply put, a voter in
New York or Texas with electoral blocs of forty-one and twenty-six votes re-
spectively has much more influence on the choice of the President than does a
voter in a state such as Alaska or Nevada with only three electoral votes.'Each state is allowed a certain number of Congressional representatives
based on the previous census count. This number plus two, corresponding to the
two United States Senators, makes up the number of electoral votes the state
will cast until the next census which may or may not alter this count. This
system does not account for increases or decreases from Presidential election to
Presidential election. Indeed, the electoral vote count allocated to each state
in the election of 1960 was based on a census of ten years earlier, 1950. More-
over, a state's electoral votes remain stagnant regardless whether 1,000 or
1,000,000 citizens participate in the Electoral selection within the state. Startling
examples can be seen in a comparison of several states. In the election of 1964
Delaware and Alaska each cast three electoral votes but the number voting, in
Delaware was three times as great as the turnout in Alaska. More voters took
advantage of the franchise in New Jersey than in Texas, albeit Texas certified a
bloc of twenty-five electoral votes while New Jersey was "represented" with
seventeen. 76
Disproportion can also be seen in the aggregate totals of two or more states
when the percentage of the popular votes won is compared with the percentage
of electoral votes won. In 1960 President Kennedy won Illinois' twenty-seven
electoral votes with a popular vote of 2,377,846, Richard Nixon receiving no
electoral votes for his 2,368,988 votes. In the state of Indiana, Nixon polled
1,175,120 popular votes receiving thirteen electoral votes while Kennedy tallied
only 952,358 votes. The combined totals of the two states reveal that Kennedy
received 67.5% of the electoral votes from Indiana and Illinois though he won
only 48.7% of the total popular vote. Mr. Nixon on the other hand won a
175 Banzhaf, One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the Elect6ral College, 13
VILL. L. Rv. 304, 317 (1968).
176 Feerick, supra note 29, at 13.
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majority 51.6% of the two state totals realizing but 32.5% of the electoral
college vote. 7 '
Even more extreme is the possibility that a candidate can win a slight
majority in eleven of the largest states receiving only about thirty per cent of the
national popular vote but still have 270 electoral votes, enough to place him in
the White House.17 8  Although this possibility is extremely improbable, the
mammoth political significance of these states has received acute attention from
the parties and candidates; "the party conventions usually choose candidates
from the largest states, and campaigns are tailored to capture their electoral
votes.': 79 The importance given this group of states is excessive, and inconsistent
with our representative form of government. This fact has been understood in
eight of the twenty-eight elections from 1860 to the present where a shift of the
electoral vote of one state to the losing candidate would have given him the
election.' 0
Another serious shortcoming of the Electoral College system is its ability to
frustrate the will of the people. This is seen in the blatant examples of the elec-
tions of 1824, 1876 and 1888."' This undemocratic result was ominously close
in the 1960 and 1968 elections, accordingly with this trend of the last decade of
extremely narrow victories the possibility that the nation will have to tolerate an
administration which was rejected at the polls seems all the more likely. This
danger is only one of many which can be placed under the heading of frustrating
the will of the people.
The problem of the faithless elector"8" has also resurfaced in the past decade
in the controversial elections of 19608 and 1968. Although chosen by the voters
of Oklahoma in 1960 as one of eight Republican electors, Henry D. Irwin cast
his ballot for Senator Harry F. Byrd who was not a candidate for the Presidency.
Even more threatening was the action of Dr. Lloyd W. Bailey in the 1968
campaign who cast his electoral ballots for George C. Wallace and Curtis E.
LeMay. The action of this obscure elector did not change the election, nor did
he throw it into the House, although it did very definitely frustrate the will of the
people of North Carolina. 4 More importantly, however, it demonstrated the
power an elector has and how it could be used in a close Presidential race. It
also suggested the fact that the Wallace campaign did have significance in that
177 24CoNG. Q. WEKLY REPT. 1811 '(Aug. 19, 1966).
178 California 45; New York 41; Illinois 26; Texas 26; Ohio 25; Michigan 19; New Jersey
17; Florida 17; Massachusetts 14; Indiana 13. Count based on 1970 census figures 29 CONG.
Q. WEEKLY REPT. 646 (March 26, 1971).
179 Rosenthal, supra note 63, at 7.
180 Hearings on Electoral College Reform Before the Committee on the Judiciary of the
House of Representatives, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. at 360 (1969) (hereinafter cited as 1969
House Hearings).
181 See notes 93 to 100, supra, and text accompanying.
182 See notes 68 to 86, supra, and text accompanying.
183 See Feerick, supra note 29, at 20.
184 See generally Comment, 6 HARv. J. LEGis. 254 (1969).
The sham of the Electoral College system was revealed to us in the most startling form
as Members of Congress debated the case of the infamous "faithless elector" from
North Carolina. It is, to me, incredible how reasonable men can continue to argue
that the Electoral College is meant as "a safeguard," when Dr. Bailey's action, in
essence, disenfranchised one-thirteenth of the voters of his State. 1969 House Hear-
ings at 97.
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a third-party candidate probably would never win an election but could throw it
into the House. Before the House could select a President, Wallace or any such
candidate could demand certain concessions in return for which he would instruct
his electors as to how they should vote, giving the accommodating candidate the
Presidency before the House could act.
Another stultifying effect of the Electoral College system is the practice of
completely disregarding the popular vote in the individual states which is cast for
a candidate other than the state's electoral vote winner. This effectively pre-
cludes the votes from one state from being added to those of other states and
thus allows the possibility of Presidents whom the people have rejected and
encourages the styling of a campaign for the lagest state's electoral votes instead
of a campaign directed at all voters nationally.
B. Remedies Available
The first proposal to reform the Electoral College system was brought before
the Congress on January 6, 1797, by Representative William L. Smith of South
Carolina.185 Since then the College has been criticized with consistency, yet it has
not been reformed to this day. However, within the past decade the movement
to abolish the Electoral College has gained new life and it is now apparent a
different system to elect the President will be adopted some time in the future.
The three major plans now suggested are: the district system, the proportional
system, and the direct popular election of the President.
The district system would use the present Electoral College allocation of
votes to each state but would do away with the electors and the winner-take-all
aspect of the present system. Instead, it provides for the award of an electoral
vote for each Congressional district a candidate wins and gives the candidate who
captures a plurality of the state's popular vote the two electoral votes at-large
which correspond to the two United States Senators. This method is viewed by
many as a fairer system, one that would reflect the wishes of the people. Indeed,
at least one state, Maine, has installed the district method for use in the 1972
elections for precisely these reasons.' 8
Although an improvement over the present mode of Presidential elections,
the winner-take-all aspect is perpetuated in five states which have only one Repre-
sentative in Congress,8 7 when awarding the two votes corresponding to the
Senators, in one-party states and in the District of Columbia. The district system
would still allow a candidate to win a majority of the state's electoral votes while
polling a minority of the popular vote. This could be realized in a state where a
candidate won a majority of the districts by razor-thin margins. It would also
promote an attempt to gerrymand districts in order to gain partisan advantage.
More importantly, it would continue the unequal voting power of a citizen
in one district as compared to another district. This is seen in the fact that the
185 Feerick, supra note 29,-at 26.
186 Letter from Joseph T. Edgar, Secretary of State of the state of Maine, August 4, 1971,
on file with the Notre Dame Lawyer.
187 Alaska, Nevada, Wyoming, Delaware and Vermont. 29 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REPT. 646(March 26, 1971).
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871,862 voters in California's thirty-fifth district elect one elector as do the
288,482 voters in North Dakota's second district. 8 " The elector from California
in this example represents more than two and one-half times the people than
the elector from North Dakota does. Each one of the ten largest districts through-
out the nation represents at least twice as many people as any one of the- eight
smallest districts does. Even if all states could be redistricted in a manner creating
exactly equal districts within each state, there would still be wide population
variances between districts in the nation. Again as with the Electoral College the
district system is based on a census which can be as old as ten years if the
Presidential election "falls in a census year. Also it does not matter how many
people are in the district since each district is allowed one vote no matter what the
turnout is.
A second mode advanced by some is the proportional system. This method
allocates the electoral vote to each candidate based on the percentage of the
popular vote he receives. For example, if the Republican candidate won eighty
percent of Georgia's popular vote while the Democrats received the remaining
twenty percent, the allocation of electoral votes would be 9.6 and 2.4 respectively.
Again this system continues the Electoral College practice of allocating votes
based on Congressional representation. The same objections are applicable here
-as were stated for the Electoral College system. An example of the injustice of
this system can be seen in the application of this mode to the 1968 Presidential
returns in Missouri and Virginia, each of which has twelve electoral votes.' Both
Nixon and Humphrey won forty-three percent of the total votes in Virginia and
Missouri. However, 'Nixon received only 590,315 votes in Virginia while
Humphrey garnered 791,444 votes in Missouri, yet under the proportional
system each would have received 5.2 electoral votes. In this situation, Mr.
Humphrey had to win 201,129 more votes than Mr. Nixon in order to receive
the same number of 'electoral votes.
In addition to the above-mentioned objections "[i]t would appear that a
proportional division of electoral votes is an open invitation to splinter groups to
disrupt the party structure by playing an increasingly important role in Presi-
dential elections."' 9 This being so since a third-party candidate has the op-
portunity of accumulating his fraction of the electoral vote received from state to
state. Thus the possibility that such a candidate might win enough electoral votes
to prevent either of the two major party candidates from receiving a majority of
the electoral total is enhanced greatly.
The direct popular election proposal is the most compatible with our one-
man, one-vote representative type of government. It is far more preferable than
the district or proportional systems since each of these retains some aspect of the
Electoral College. Direct popular election eliminates the inequalities which exist
under the present system and which would continue under any modification of it;
it eliminates the dangerous possibility of the faithless elector, and it eliminates the
archaic practice of the House choosing the President if no candidate receives a
majority vote. Also such facts as "sure" states, pivotal states, the unit rule can-
188 Id. at 645.
189 Bayh, Electing a President - The Case for Direct Popular Election, 6 HARv. J. Laols.
127, 135 '(1969).
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ceiling out the majority vote, and fraud affecting the disposition of a state's
electoral bloc would disappear.1 90
The insignificance of the Electoral College is seen in the ballot laws of the
several states, a majority of which list only the names of the candidates, not the
electors. Indeed, the Electoral College "has suffered atrophy almost indistinguish-
able from rigor mortis."' 9 '
The demise of the whole electoral system would not impress me as a
disaster. At best it is a mystifying and distorting factor which may resolve
a popular defeat into an election victory. At its worst it is open to local
corruption and manipulation, once so flagrant as to threaten the stability of
the country. To abolish it and substitute direct election of the President, so
that every vote wherever cast would have equal weight in calculating the
result, would seem to me a gain for simplicity and integrity of our govern-
mental process. 92
When this nation adopted the Seventeenth Amendment which provided for the
popular election of Senators it chose the fairest, simplest, most democratic
method. With the adoption of this amendment the "nation forgot about small
counties versus large counties, rural citizens versus urban citizens (and) liberal
vot s versus conservative votes."'93
The objections to direct popular election are many although in essence
meaningless. One, the fear of the destruction of the two-party system, is fanciful
at best. Since under the direct-election system a third-party candidate would
have no electors to instruct as to how to cast their ballots, much of the strength
of their campaigns would be lost. Also, if such a campaign polled enough votes
to prevent a major party candidate from receiving forty percent of the popular
vote, then a runoff election would be conducted to determine the winner instead
of a House election. 94
The concern that the minority groups would lose their voice overlooks
the fact that with the direct voting system their votes are added to that of groups
from other states with similar political feelings. Thus the voting strength of
minorities would increase beyond what it is under the present system to a level of
equality with every other voter in the nation.
The concern for these minority groups rises from the fact that in certain
190 For examples of additional controversies affecting a State's electoral vote see Wroth,
supra note 41, at 323.
191 Ray v. Blair 343 U.S. 214, 232 (1952) (dissenting opinion of Jackson, J.).
192 Id. at 224.
193 Hearings on Electing the President Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amend-
ments of the Committee of the Judiciary of the United States Senate, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. at 65
(1969) (hereinafter cited as 1969 Senate Hearings).
194 Forty percent is the minimum requirement most often suggested. See ELECTING TEE
PRESMENT, A REPORT OF TnE COMMISSION or ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM, AMERICAN.- BAR
ASSOCIATION at 8 (1967); a run-off is proposed by the A. B. A. Id. But Senator Bayh's revised
proposal introduced on January 28, 1971, eliminate the run-off provision, providing that:
If no pair of candidates received 40 percent of the vote, but if the pair of candidates
with the largest popular vote won an electoral college majority - with the votes cast
automatically under the unit rule on the basis of the popular outcome in each State
- that pair of candidates would be elected President and Vice-President.
117 CONG. REc. 92nd Cong. 1st Sess. S 464 (Daily ed.) (January 28, 1971). If still no candi-
date is selected final selection would be made by Congress from the two highest candidates. Id.
at S 465.
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areas they have the power to determine how a "swing" state will ultimately go
and possibly affect the election. This greater voting power is the result of the
Electoral College and with this status these groups command more attention and
force the candidates to be more responsive to their desires. The fact of the matter
is that this reasoning is directly opposed to the concept of one man-one vote
without regard to sex, color, residence or economic state. "The notion that one
group can be granted greater voting strength than another is hostile to our
standards for popular representative government."' 9 5
In answer to direct election, it has also been suggested that state lines would
be wiped out in a Presidential election and the very basis of our federal system
threatened. Although there would be no "state vote" as is the practice under the
present system, each jurisdiction would retain a significant role to play in the
electoral process. The states "would continue to have the primary responsibility
for regulating the places and manner of holding the Presidential election, for
establishing qualifications for voting in such elections, and for controlling
political activity within their State boundaries."' 96 Perhaps the most compelling
explanation of the continued existence of the federal system with the practice
of a direct popular vote for the President was advanced by Senator Mansfield
when he stated:
[T]he Federal system is not strengthened through an antiquated device
which has not worked as it was intended to work when it was included in the
Constitution and which, if anything, has become a divisive force in the
Federal System by pitting groups of States against groups of States. As I
see the Federal System in contemporary practice, the House of Representa-
tives is the key to the protection of district interests as district interests, just
as the Senate is the key to the protection of State interests as State interests.
These instrumentalities, and particularly the Senate, are the principal con-
stitutional safeguards of the Federal System; but the Presidency has evolved,
out of necessity, into the principal political office, as the Courts have become
the principal legal bulwark beyond districts, beyond States, for safeguarding
the interests of all the people in all the States. And since such is the
case, in my opinion, the Presidency should be subject to the direct and equal
control of all the people.1 97
In an effort to thwart its adoption, some have even argued that an election
of President by direct popular vote would obviate the intention and design of
the Framers of the Constitution. To subscribe to such a theory, a person would of
necessity have to overlook, indeed, disregard the reasoning which the Framers
gave as an explanation for this compromise. 9 The primary reason the election
of the President directly by the people was rejected by the Constitutional Con-
vention was the alleged ignorance of the people. But the Electoral College was
designed long before our current levels of education, political sophistication,
mass transportation and communication which would have given the delegates
confidence in the average voter's ability to choose wisely between candidates.'99
195 MacDougal v. Green 335 U.S. 281, 290 (1948) (Douglas dissenting).
196 ELECTING THE PRESIDENT, supra note 194, at 6.
197 107 CONG. REc. 350 (1961) (remarks of Senator Mansfield).
198 See generally notes 32 to 36, supra, and text accompanying.
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At the present moment, the electorate of the United States is "sufficiently well-
informed and politically aware to provide for the election of the President and
Vice-President by the direct popular vote."2 0 As President Lincoln declared in
his first inaugural address: "This country, with its institutions, belongs to the
people who inhabit it ... Why should there not be a patient confidence in the
ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better or equal hope in the world?"2 1
The most serious threat to the potential viability of direct popular election
is the fear that the states will not ratify it. Earlier in our nation's history, this may
have posed a problem but at the present time with the recent expansion of the
franchise, the recognized power of the ballot and the innate desire for equality,
politically as well as socially, the efficacy of such a threat is substantially lessened.
A recent poll of state legislators by Senator Quentin M. Burdick of North
Dakota, showed that of the 2,500 out of 8,000 legislators who replied, a signifi-
cant 58.8% favored the direct vote. Equally interesting is that support from
large and small states was almost equal." 2 The first national poll concerning
direct popular election demonstrated that 63% of those interviewed supported
this method.0 ' A later poll showed an increase of 3% to 66% support for
direct election.2  In 1968, more than 80% of the nation "favored an amend-
ment of the Constitution to do away with the Electoral College and base the
election of a President on the total vote cast throughout the Nation. 2 0 5
The adoption of an amendment to provide for the direct election of the
President would ensure every voter an equal chance of affecting the outcome of
such an election. No other existing proposal can even approximate such equality.
V. Conclusion
Political equality demands the principle of voter equality on every election
level. As the state of Delaware argued in its brief attacking the Electoral Col-
lege: "Both Equal Protection and Due Process should mean that no citizen must
go to the polls under the threat of such potential debasement of his vote." ' 6
Potential debasement has been mathematically demonstrated ;217 the Supreme
Court has stated that when this is the case such an election system will be
meticulously scrutinized and its proponents will bear the heavy burden of
justifying the continuance of such a system.20" It is difficult to imagine a logical
argument purporting to justify the continuance of the Electoral College at the
present time.
As stated the only alternative is the substitution of a direct election system
under which:
200 1969 House Hearings at 97.
201 1969 Senate Hearings at 67.
202 1969 House Hearings at 45.
203 20CONG. Q. WEEKLY REPT. 1042 (1966).
204 N. Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1968 at 61 Col. 1.
205 1969 House Hearings at 508. A Harris poll showed 78% favored direct election of the
President. Id.
206 See brief of Delaware v. New York 385 U.S. 895 (1966). 1969 Senate Hearings at 757.
207 See Banzhaf, supra note 175, and text accompanying.
208 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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every-voter casts one vote, a whole vote, which is just as good and just as
important as the vote cast by any other voter in the country. ***This is the
final step in the constitutional evolution which began with the Declaration
that all men are created equal and continued with the assertion that no
man or woman may be denied the right to vote for arbitrary reasons. Now
we must make the suffrage an equal suffrage, and repudiate arbitrary and
discriminatory geographical basis for denying or reducing the importance
of the votes of some of our citizens. 0 9
The necessity for such a change in the determination of the President is
compelling. Indeed, men have demanded that they should not be governed
without their consent; but there were those who pointed to the Black man. Men
said they could not be taxed without representation, but there were those who
pointed to women. Men have stated that the concept of universal suffrage was
a glorious ideal; but there were those who pointed to minors.210 Men have said
democracy is a universal concept; but there were those who pointed to the election
of the President.
The most impressive fact about democracy is: the greater the franchise is
extended, the greater is the need for everyone to participate in it on an equal
basis, for without equality such a democracy is empty.
Alfred J. Lechner, Jr.
209 99 CONG. REV. 1726 (1953) (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
210 Kirby, supra note 168, at 1000.
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